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Book	Review:	Orbán:	Europe’s	New	Strongman	by
Paul	Lendvai
In	Orbán:	Europe’s	New	Strongman,	Paul	Lendvai	examines	how,	via	a	‘lightning-speed	assault’	on	its	democratic
features,	Hungary	can	now	be	better	characterised	as	an	authoritarian	system	under	the	rule	of	Viktor	Orbán.
Exploring	such	topics	as	the	deterioration	of	the	country’s	rule	of	law,	the	end	of	the	separation	of	powers	and	mass
clientelism,	Lendvai	succeeds	in	tracing	Hungary’s	rapid	slide	towards	authoritarianism	in	this	excellent	book,
writes	Paul	Caruana-Galizia.	
Orbán:	Europe’s	New	Strongman.	Paul	Lendvai.	Hurst	Publishers.	2017.
Find	this	book:	
From	fascism	to	Stalinism	to	communism,	it	looked	like	Hungary	had	finally	broken	free
of	authoritarian	rule	in	1989.	Just	under	ten	years	later,	Viktor	Orbán	won	the	country’s
third	free	election	in	1998,	providing	him	with	his	first	taste	of	power	as	Prime	Minister.
Having	won	by	a	whisker,	he	was	dropped	after	one	term,	but	what	looked	like	a	brief
swerve	back	onto	the	authoritarian	path	was,	when	seen	through	the	rearview	mirror,	a
clear	direction	of	travel.	Orbán	was	returned	to	power	in	2010	with	two-thirds	of	the
seats	in	Hungary’s	parliament:	‘we	only	have	to	win	once,	but	then	properly,’	he	had
said	from	opposition	(94).	This	time,	he	won	the	power	to	rewrite	Hungary’s
constitution,	and	he	meant	it	when	he	said	that	‘the	new	state	that	we	are	building	in
Hungary	is	an	illiberal	state,	not	a	liberal	state’.
Other	descriptions	of	Orbán’s	new	state	have	been	less	kind.	Paul	Lendvai	summarises
them	in	his	new	book,	Orbán:	Europe’s	New	Strongman,	in	a	chapter	called	‘The	New
Conquest’	(Chapter	Ten).	Journalist	Rudolf	Ungváry	calls	it	a	‘fascistoid	mutation’	(92);
former	education	minister,	Bálint	Magyar,	‘a	post-communist	mafia	state’	(91).	There
are	others,	but	the	one	that	Lendvai	favours	is	more	subtle,	from	another	former	education	minister,	András	Bozóki:
Hungary	is	now	‘a	hybrid	regime’	in	which	‘the	features	of	an	authoritarian	system	are	stronger	than	those	of	a
democracy’	(92).
Lendvai	covers	these	authoritarian	features	over	the	course	of	his	excellent	book	–	deterioration	in	Hungary’s	rule	of
law;	the	end	of	the	separation	of	powers;	gerrymandering;	the	creation	of	an	oligarchy;	grand	corruption;	and	mass
clientelism.	It’s	a	testament	to	Lendvai’s	writing	that	he	can	sketch	the	evolution	of	an	authoritarian	state	over	230
pages.	Perhaps	this	is	because	Orbán’s	changes	were	so	fast	–	a	‘lightning-speed	assault’	(94)	–	and	because	there
are	so	few	democratic	features	left	on	which	to	write.	Indeed,	for	Lendvai,	Hungary’s	only	remaining	democratic
component	is	‘the	theoretical	possibility	of	removing	the	government’	in	an	election	(92).
What	to	make	of	Orbán	himself?	He	calls	himself	a	‘right-wing	plebeian’.	In	his	book’s	subtitle,	Lendvai	describes	him
as	‘Europe’s	new	strongman’.	Lendvai,	an	88-year-old	Hungarian-born	journalist	who	has	written	widely	on	Central
Europe	and	authoritarianism,	knows	that	Orbán	is	‘new’	only	in	the	sense	that	he	is	the	latest	issue	in	a	long	series	of
European	strongmen.	He	knows	there	is	little	that	is	novel	about	Orbán’s	governing	techniques	and	route	to	power,
two	themes	he	expresses	lucidly	in	his	book.
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There’s	a	long	debate	on	whether	strongmen	shape	history	or	whether	history	proceeds	regardless.	Lendvai’s	view
of	Orbán	is	that	he	is	more	shaper	than	shaped.	He	starts	with	a	chapter,	‘The	Personal	Touch’,	describing	Orbán’s
initial	rise	as	liberal	student	activist.	The	scene:	Heroes’	Square,	Budapest,	1989,	when	communist	Hungary	was
collapsing	and	anything	must	have	seemed	possible.	A	26-year-old	Orbán	rises	to	speak:
If	we	trust	our	own	strength,	then	we	will	be	able	to	put	an	end	to	the	communist	dictatorship.	If	we	are
determined	enough,	then	we	can	compel	the	ruling	party	to	face	free	elections	[…]	If	we	are	courageous
enough,	then,	but	only	then,	we	can	fulfill	the	will	of	our	revolution	(8).
József	Debreczeni,	author	of	a	previous	Orbán	biography	on	which	Lendvai	relies	heavily,	described	this	moment	as
‘the	meeting	of	extraordinary	luck	with	extraordinary	talent’	(8).
Above	all,	strongmen	are	both	forceful	orators	and	highly	cynical.	Something	else	Orbán	declared	in	his	liberal
student	activist	days:	‘the	leadership	of	governing	parties	[…]	are	very	much	inclined	to	reject	criticism	of	government
policy	by	suggesting	the	opposition	or	media	are	undermining	the	standing	of	Hungary,	are	attacking	the	Hungarian
nation	itself’	(26).	There	are	two	reasons	why	this	may	sound	familiar.	First,	it	outlines	how	strongmen	everywhere
rebut	criticism.	They	associate	themselves	with	the	state	and	nation,	so	that	criticism	of	them	is	criticism	of	these	too.
Their	critics	become	‘traitors’	(if	domestic)	or,	in	that	well-known	Stalinist	phrase,	‘enemies	of	the	people’	(if	domestic
or	foreign).	Second,	we	see	some	of	Orbán’s	u-turn	cynicism	in	the	way	he	now	deals	with	his	critics	as	Prime
Minister.	Under	fire	for	his	attack	on	Hungary’s	rule	of	law,	Orbán	says	his	critics	are	attacking	Hungary.	Lendvai
observes	that	this	‘nationalist-populist’	behaviour	both	mobilises	Hungarians	and	separates	‘the	cause	of	the	nation’
from	‘that	of	liberty’	(113).
Personal	traits	are	necessary,	but	insufficient.	Lendvai	shows	us	how	Orbán’s	route	to	power	opened	up	when	his
main	opposition,	the	Hungarian	left,	disappointed	the	electorate	with	a	long-running	mixture	of	economic
incompetence	and	corruption.	Orbán	cast	himself	as	the	new,	youngish	outsider	against	a	left	characterised	as	‘a
disgusting	snake	pit	of	old	communists	and	leftwing	careerists	posing	as	social	democrats’	(74).	Strongmen	feed	off
a	sense	of	exclusion	among	voters.	Many	Hungarians	lost	out	in	the	switch	from	communism	to	free-market
capitalism.	What	do	you	sell	to	individuals	who	feel	excluded?	You	sell	them	greatness	–	fantasies	of	national
greatness.	Orbán	looks	back	with	regret	at	the	immense	territories	his	people’s	country	lost	after	World	War	I.	He
plays	on	a	sense	of	national	loss	better	than	any	Hungarian	politician.
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Power.	Once	strongmen	seize	it,	they	grow	it.	They	occupy	the	state,	repress	civil	society	and	the	media	and	engage
in	clientelism:	Jan-Werner	Müller’s	three	techniques	of	populist	government,	alluded	to	by	Lendvai	(106).	In
particular,	Orbán	is	bent	on	the	‘political	annihilation	of	his	opponents	and	rivals’	(38).	Lendvai	frames	this	in	terms	of
Orbán’s	combative	personality,	but	it	has	practical	ends	too.	Backed	by	his	supermajority,	Orbán’s	new	constitution,
the	‘Fundamental	Law	of	Hungary’,	gave	him	control	of	the	constitutional	court	and	ended	the	separation	of	powers
in	Hungary.	It	was	‘an	unconstitutional	coup	[…under]	the	cover	of	constitutionality,	with	constitutional	means’	(110).	
The	academic	János	Kornai	describes	Orbán’s	aims	since	2010	as	‘the	systematic	demolition	of	the	fundamental
institutions	of	democracy’	(92).	Thus,	Orbán	can	now	mean	it	when	he	says	his	critics	are	‘enemies	of	the	state’
(231).
For	all	their	posturing,	strongmen’s	attacks	on	civil	society	betray	what	Francis	Fukayama	calls	an	‘authoritarian	thin
skin’.	In	June	2017	the	Hungarian	parliament	passed	a	law	on	the	‘Transparency	of	Organisations	Supported	from
Abroad’.	Much	like	Vladimir	Putin’s	draconian	‘foreign	agents’	law’,	the	Hungarian	law	requires	NGOs	with	foreign
funding	to	be	placed	on	a	register,	publicly	declare	they	receive	foreign	funding	and	identify	individual	foreign	donors
(211).	Failure	to	comply	means	financial	sanctions	or	expulsion.	Amnesty	International	called	it	‘an	assault	on	civil
society	[that]	is	aimed	at	silencing	critical	voices	within	the	country’.	It	is	against	this	backdrop	that	George	Soros,
who	founded	the	Central	European	University	(CEU)	in	Budapest	and	funds	anti-corruption	and	pro-democracy
programmes,	became	Orbán’s	‘public	enemy	number	one’	(208).	Orbán	is	threatening	to	shut	down	CEU	while
continuously	and	aggressively	vilifying	Soros,	accusing	him	of	weakening	the	nation	state.	As	Lendvai	writes,	this	is
not	so	much	a	personal	conflict;	rather,	Soros	represents	liberal	democracy.
When	it	comes	to	the	media,	strongmen	seek	to	either	outright	silence	or	slyly	co-opt	critical	voices.	Fidesz,	Orbán’s
party,	began	building	a	media	empire	long	before	his	election	through	a	group	of	friendly	oligarchs	(75-76).	Once	in
power,	Orbán	used	his	supermajority	to	pass	a	media	law	that	empowered	him	to	take	over	public	broadcasters,
appoint	apparaticks	to	their	management,	distribute	subsidies	to	friendly	non-state	media	and	run	a	Media	Council
that	allocated	frequencies,	imposed	sanctions	and	dictates	the	meaning	of	‘balanced	news’	reporting	(115).	Orbán’s
end	goal?	The	‘disappearance	of	objective	truth’	(207).	The	OSCE	Representative	on	Freedom	of	the	Media
described	the	law	as	‘totalitarian’	(115).
Strongmen	use	their	control	of	the	state	not	just	to	repress	critics,	but	also	to	patronise	clients.	Under	Orbán,
clientelism	is	practised	openly	and	with	public	moral	justification.	Orbán	claims	that	his	people	are	the	real	people
and	so	deserve	the	support	of	their	state.	Here’s	András	Lánczi,	Orbán’s	main	‘public	intellectual’	tool:	‘What	is	called
corruption	is	actually	Fidesz’s	supreme	policy	[…]	the	government	has	set	for	itself	goals	such	as	the	establishment
of	a	group	of	domestic	entrepreneurs,	the	building	of	the	pillars	of	a	strong	Hungary’	(151).	Those	‘entrepreneurs’
have	with	strong	state	support	become	Hungary’s	oligarchy,	building	a	strong	Fidesz	rather	than	a	strong	Hungary,	in
the	same	way	Putin	created	and	uses	Russia’s	oligarchy	to	support	his	own	mafia	state.
Can	Orbán	be	stopped?	Lendvai	isn’t	optimistic.	He	concludes	his	book	by	describing	Hungary’s	future	as	‘bleak’
with	little	chance	for	‘progressive	and	liberal	change’	(230).	Yet,	it’s	unfair	to	demand	solutions	of	Lendvai:	that
challenge	is	hard	and	beyond	the	scope	of	Orbán.	Rather,	the	book	is	an	example	of	political	writing	that	not	only
shows	us	what’s	wrong	with	Hungary	and	Orbán,	but	how	easy	it	is	for	a	country	to	slide	towards	authoritarianism
under	a	strongman.
Dr	Paul	Caruana-Galizia	is	a	Visiting	Fellow	in	the	Department	of	Economic	History	at	the	London	School	of
Economics.	He	is	the	author	of	The	Economy	of	Modern	Malta	and	Mediterranean	Labor	Markets	in	the	First	Age	of
Globalization.	He	tweets	@pcaruanagalizia.	Read	more	by	Paul	Caruana-Galizia.
Note:	This	review	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Review	of	Books	blog,	or	of	the
London	School	of	Economics.	
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